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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Shane Byington appeals from the dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and the proceedings in 
Byington's underlying criminal case and appeal as follows: 
On New Year's Eve 2007, there was a party held at a 
residence shared by Byington, his girlfriend, Crystal Lundberg, and 
Lundberg's daughter, C.L. At the party Lundberg got into a 
physical fight with Byington's niece. Lundberg and C.L. left the 
residence and stayed elsewhere that night. Lundberg apparently 
was upset with Byington for not intervening in the fight and the 
next day she and C.L. went back to pack up their possessions. 
Corey Richardson, C.L.'s cousin, learned of the altercation and 
that Lundberg and C.L. were at the Byington residence and went 
to the home to retrieve C.L. from a place and situation he 
considered not safe. Byington let Richardson into the residence 
and words were exchanged between the men in the immediate 
presence of Lundgren [sic] and C.L. At some point, Byington 
grabbed a shotgun, either pointed it at or displayed it to 
Richardson, and told him to get out of the house. Richardson and 
C.L. left and Richardson called the police. Both Richardson and 
C.L. filled out written police statements. Richardson's statement 
said that during the confrontation Byington became angry and 
pointed the shotgun at him. C.L's statement said that Byington 
"pointed a gun at my cousin Cory Richardson only because he 
asked what happened last night and Mike said a fight said [sic] get 
out of my house while pointing the gun at my cousin Cory." 
Byington was charged with aggravated assault by use of a 
deadly weapon. Idaho Code §§ 18-901, -905(a). At trial he 
contended that he acted in justifiable self-defense out of fear of 
physical assault by Richardson. Lundgren [sic] testified in 
Byington's defense but C.L., although she attended the trial and 
was listed as a defense witness, did not. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. 
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Byington hired a new attorney and filed a motion for a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. His evidence 
consisted of C.L.'s affidavit in which she stated that during the 
confrontation Richardson was angry, yelling and throwing his 
hands about while stepping back and forth towards Byington, that 
Byington did not point the gun at Richardson but only held it to his 
chest, that she felt pressured and intimidated by Richardson and 
her father's family to back up Richardson's statement to the 
contrary, and that she did not tell Byington's trial attorneys about 
these things. At the hearing on Byington's motion for a new trial, 
however, C.L. testified differently from her affidavit on one point, 
stating that she told Byington's trial attorneys that, contrary to her 
police statement, Byington did not point the gun at Richardson. 
Her testimony is ambiguous as to whether she gave this 
information to the attorneys before of after Byington's trial. The 
district court denied the motion for a new trial on multiple grounds. 
Byington appeal[ed]. 
State v. Byington, Docket No. 35697, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 616, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App., September 18, 2009). 
Byington argued on appeal that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of an 
affidavit of C.L. kl at p.2. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Byington's 
judgment of conviction finding he "did not establish that he could not have 
discovered the matters presented in C.L.'s affidavit and testimony by the 
exercise of diligence prior to his trial." kl at pp.2-3. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Byington filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging 10 
separate instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.4-11.) Byington 
claimed counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel quit seven days before 
the jury trial; substitute trial counsel failed to conduct any independent 
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investigation and instead relied on previous counsel's preparation; counsel 
"ignored [Byington] pointing out that a jury panel member was a police officer 
who was under the misunderstanding that [he] had previously had an affair with 
his wife;" said "police officer ended up on the jury panel and during the trial made 
a face at Byington;" counsel at trial "failed to call an eyewitness;" counsel at trial 
"failed to object to the subject weapon being referred to as a 'sawed-off shotgun' 
when the subject shotgun was as shipped from the factory;" a police officer lied in 
response to a question on direct concerning the nature of Byington's weapon and 
counsel did not object to the response by the officer nor object to a lack of 
foundation "that the subject shotgun was loaded or had a shell in the chamber at 
the time of the confrontation that lead [sic] to the charges in this matter;" and the 
officer who allegedly lied "was subsequently arrested, charged and convicted of 
molesting children." (R., p.5.) The state filed an ar:iswer requesting the court 
dismiss Byington's petition for post-conviction relief for failure to allege sufficient 
facts that would warrant a conclusion that trial counsel was deficient or that any 
deficiency prejudiced Byington. (R., pp.27-31.) The court scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on Byington's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.34-
35.) 
At the hearing Byington himself, his girlfriend, and one of the members of 
his trial team testified. (See generally Tr. 1 , pp.9-77.) During the evidentiary 
hearing, counsel for Byington asked the court to consider a portion of an audio 
1 There are two transcripts on appeal: a jury trial transcript and the transcript 
from the evidentiary hearing. Because only the latter is cited to in this brief, it will 
be referred to simply as "Tr." 
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recording of Byington's arrest to demonstrate Byington had not given law 
enforcement permission to enter his home to retrieve the gun used in the 
aggravated assault, asserting had trial counsel reviewed it, they would have 
realized the officer's actions violated Byington's Fourth Amendment rights. (Tr., 
p.56, L.18 - p.59, L.1.) The state clearly objected to Byington's attempt to try an 
issue not raised by his petition: "[T]he premise that counsel should have done a 
motion to suppress is not one of the allegations in the petition for post-conviction 
relief. It's something that we could have addressed had it been in there." (Tr., 
p.59, Ls.16-20.) The court agreed that Byington's petition contained no 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to 
suppress. (Tr., p.60, Ls.10-17.) Nevertheless, it admitted the audio and agreed 
to listen to it over the state's objection to its being outside the scope of Byington's 
petition. (Tr., p.85, L.8 - p.87, L.1.) The court reserved ruling on the new issue 
Byington attempted to raise during the evidentiary hearing: 
THE COURT: [ ... ] 
And it's for that reason, [counsel for the state], that I'm 
sort of giving you a heads up that I may request some 
additional argument or so forth from the parties. Because I 
think we all agree, this was sort of news to all of us. 
MR. ROCKSTAHL [Byington's counsel]: It was. 
THE COURT: It really didn't look like a negligent failure to file 
a motion to suppress at the beginning, coming in today. 
So let me just go ahead and gather that information 
up. And then I'll - you'll either get a decision from me or an 
order for some new material. Okay? 
(Tr., p.87, Ls.7-19.) 
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After the hearing, the court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing 
on the question of whether the unpled allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress could be considered by the court. 
(R., pp.41-43.) Byington complied with the court's request for additional briefing 
(R., pp.45-55) and, without permission of the court, also filed a "Supplemental 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief' to "include the recently discovered issue 
regarding the violation of his Miranda rights, illegal warrantless search and use of 
evidence and admissions illegally acquired" (R., p.56). The state filed a 
memorandum in support of its objection to the new claim not raised in the 
petition. (R., pp.59-64.) 
The court dismissed Byington's petition for post-conviction relief, finding: 
The Petitioner attempted to and in fact was allowed by the 
Court to introduce evidence of an alleged illegal custodial 
interrogation and subsequent search. These matters were not 
raised in the original Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, 
the Court now rules that those claims were waived and will not be 
considered. 
On the merits of the matters raised in the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, the Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to 
carry his burden of persuading the Court by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the allegations are true. Therefore, the Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief is dismissed. 
(R., p.65.) 
Byington timely appeals. (R., pp.69-71.) 
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ISSUE 
Byington states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it found Mr. Byington's 
suppression related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be 
waived because it was not in his original petition? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Byington failed to establish the district court erred in failing to allow an 
amendment to his petition for post-conviction relief to add an additional claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on the day of the evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Byington Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Failing To Allow An 
Amendment To His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief For An Issue First Raised 
During The Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
The sole issue raised on this appeal involves the propriety of the district 
court's order dismissing Byington's unpled claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress at trial. Byington argues the 
district court erred as a matter of law by ruling "that by not raising the 
suppression motion claim in his original post-conviction petition [Byington] waived 
the claim." (Appellant brief, p.4.) Byington's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's decision whether to grant or deny a motion to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 574-75, 798 P.2d 27, 33-34 (1990); Obray v. 
Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1997); Cameron Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 
93 Idaho 451, 463 P.2d 287 (1970). 
C. Byington Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Failed 
To Allow An Amendment To His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Byington acknowledges the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to file a motion to suppress "was not raised in the initial petition for 
post-conviction relief." (Appellant's brief, p.1.) However, he appears to claim 
that because "he had presented evidence concerning a new claim, with the 
permission of the district court" and subsequently filed a supplemental petition for 
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post-conviction relief adding the new claim, the district court erred in failing to 
allow the amendment to his petition and in dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief in its entirety. (Appellant's brief, p.6.} Correct application of the 
law shows Byington is incorrect. 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in 
nature. Bearshield v. State, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,315, 900 P.2d 221,223 (Ct. App. 1995). All 
grounds for relief, and the facts in support thereof, must be specifically set forth 
in the original, supplemental, or amended application. I.C. § 19-4908. Although 
the trial court "may make appropriate orders for amendment of the application," 
I.C. § 19-4906, such amendments are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. 
App. 2008); see Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 
(2004); Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001 ); !.C.R. 
57(b). Specifically, where the petitioner moves to amend the application to 
conform to the evidence presented at trial, I.R.C.P. 15(b) provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and 
shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party 
in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The 
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court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
In support of his position, Byington points to the fact he presented 
evidence supporting his new claim "with the permission of the district court." 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) "Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not 
established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was introduced 
without objection." Monahan, 145 Idaho at 876, 187 P.3d at 1250 (citing M.K. 
Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980)). 
"The trial court has the discretion to determine whether the parties have 
consented to trial of the unpled issue." Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875, 187 P.3d at 
1250. Here, although the district court did agree to listen to the proffered 17 
minutes of a police officer's audio outside of court, such concession by the court 
was made over the objection of the state: "And just so that we're clear for the 
record, I'm stipulating to the admission of the audio, but I'm not waiving my 
objection of being outside the scope of the petition." (Tr., p.86, L.22 - p.87, L.1.) 
Although Byington asserts "[t]he State also provided argument disputing 
the merits of the new claim" (Appellant's brief, p.2, n.3), such "arguments" by the 
state were made in conjunction with and subsequent to objecting to the issue 
being tried when not raised in Byington's petition for post-conviction relief: "the 
premise that counsel should have done a motion to suppress is not one of the 
allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief. It's something that we could 
have addressed had it been in there" (Tr., p.59, Ls.16-20). The district court 
recognized failure to file a motion to suppress had not been raised as one of the 
10 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Byington's petition and 
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was only recognized by the court as a potential issue once Byington tried to 
admit the audio in support of his argument over the state's objection: 
Well, Counsel, [counsel for Byington], frankly, in reading the 
petition for post-conviction relief, I have the same concern 
expressed by counsel for the respondent here. 
And that is that in reading the petition for post-conviction 
relief, there is not a specific contention that trial counsel, whether 
[initial counsel] or his new attorneys ... , failed to provide effective 
assistance of counsel by neglecting to file a motion to suppress the 
shotgun that was apparently found during a warrantless search. 
(Tr., p.60, Ls.6-17.) Because it is clear from the record the issue was not tried 
by the express or implied consent of the parties, in order to amend his petition to 
include the new issue, Byington required the permission of the court. I.R.C.P. 
15. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court took the matter 
under advisement and later ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing 
"on the issue that had not been previously raised." (R., pp.40-43.) It was only 
then that Byington filed a "Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction Relief" 
asserting the newly raised claim. (R., pp.56-58.) The state argued Byington had 
waived the claim as it was clear he had or should have had knowledge of it at the 
time the petition was filed. (R., pp.60-61.) The court denied Byington's petition 
for post-conviction relief finding, as relating to the motion to suppress claim: 
The Petitioner attempted to and in fact was allowed by the Court to 
introduce evidence of an alleged illegal custodial interrogation and 
subsequent search. These matters were not raised in the original 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, the Court now rules 
that those claims were waived and will not be considered. 
(R., p.65.) 
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In Monahan v. State, testimony was elicited by post-conviction counsel at 
an evidentiary hearing regarding Monahan's expression to trial counsel of his 
desire to withdraw his guilty plea. 145 Idaho at 874, 187 P.3d at 1249. The 
state objected on the basis that the issue had not been not raised as one of the 
17 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged in Monahan's petition for 
post-conviction relief. kl The district court at evidentiary hearing "expressly 
ruled that the testimony was not admissible as to any allegation of ineffective 
assistance with regard to an effort to withdraw the guilty plea." 145 Idaho at 876, 
187 P .3d at 1251. The Court of Appeals, in finding the "state did not impliedly 
consent to trying the unpled theory and that the district court specifically ruled 
that the issue could not be raised," held "[s]imply because the testimony was 
admitted relating to whether Monahan was competent to plead guilty does not 
demonstrate the parties consented to try any other issue." kl 
Here, the state maintained its objection to Byington's claim at evidentiary 
hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress because it 
had not been raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. Byington attempted 
to admit a 17-minute audio in support of this new contention, over the objection 
of the state as to its relevance to pied claims. The state ultimately stipulated to 
the authenticity of the audio in the face of foundational concerns, but maintained 
its objection that the audio itself was irrelevant as outside the scope of the 
petition. (Tr., p.83, L.16 - p.87, L.1.) The district court recognized the issue was 
not included in Byington's petition for post-conviction relief and was going to 
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"gather ... information up" before making a ruling on the unpled issue. (Tr., 
p.87, Ls. 2-19.) 
The court ultimately ruled the matters not raised in Byington's petition 
were waived and would not be considered. (R., p.65.) Because the state did not 
expressly or implicitly consent to trying Byington's unpled claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress and the district court 
never permitted the amendment of Byington's pleading to include this new claim, 
the district court correctly dismissed Byington's petition for post-conviction relief. 
While amendments to pleadings should be liberally granted when justice 
so requires, a trial court has broad discretion to deny a request where there is 
"undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Thus, for 
example, a trial court properly refuses permission to amend a civil complaint 
when the record contains no allegations that, if proven, would entitle the party to 
the relief claimed. Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865, 869, 727 P.2d 1293, 1297 
(Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). I.R.C.P. 15 allows for the amendment "once 
as a matter of course" any time before a response is filed and "the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar." Because Byington's case was in the middle 
of an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief before the new 
issue was raised, Byington needed "leave of court or [ ] written consent of the 
[state]" to amend his petition. I.R.C.P. 15 (a). He had neither. The state made 
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its objection to the petition repeatedly known. The district court reserved ruling 
on the newly raised issue pending review of all of the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing while noting the success of the unpled issue was not 
guaranteed even if allowed to be included in the original petition for post-
conviction relief: "[w]ether or not that motion would have been granted and the 
shotgun suppressed may or may not carry the day." (Tr., p.60, Ls.18-20.) The 
district court was not required to provide leave to amend a post-conviction 
petition already consisting of 10 separate claims when introduced in the middle of 
evidentiary hearing where there was no reason given for the failure to include the 
allegation in the original petition and no showing that Byington would be entitled 
to the relief sought with the amendment. Byington has failed to show error in the 
district court's denial of his attempt to amend his petition and the subsequent 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Byington argues the district court improperly denied his claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress on the 
incorrect theory that this was an impermissible successive petition for post-
conviction relief. As discussed above, the district court's decision was consistent 
with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 15 and I.C. § 19-4908 and, as such, should be 
affirmed by this Court. See, ~. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 
P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(1997) (where the lower court reaches the correct result by a different theory, the 
appellate court will affirm the order on the correct theory). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order dismissing Byington's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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